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A note on Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: Strategic use of corporate social responsibility
Published in Economics Bulletin
Volume: 38
Pages: 1720 - 1726

This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.

About the journal
JournalEconomics Bulletin
PublisherEconomics Bulletin
Open AccessYes
Concepts (5)
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    Stackelberg outcome
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    Corporate social responsibility
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    Cournot game
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    Nonprofit orientation