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On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
Published in Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Volume: 54
Issue: 4
Pages: 581 - 607
We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy-proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterize the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of efficiency is not desirable always. Further, we provide a simple description of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. The key feature of our characterization results brings out the role played by indifferent agents.
About the journal
JournalData powered by TypesetSocial Choice and Welfare
PublisherData powered by TypesetSpringer Science and Business Media LLC
Open Access0