In a world where individuals care about social status as determined by the rank in the distribution of con (spicuous consumption among peers, a fall in the level of visible inequality, by intensifying the degree of status competition, is likely to cause individuals to spend more on conspicuous goods which are assumed to carry sta (tus. I examine this hypothesis using nationally representative micro data from India. I find that a decrease in the level of visible inequality, ceteris paribus, causes conspicuous consumption of households to increase signifi (cantly. This increase in conspicuous spending not only represents consumption distortion, but is also wasteful as it results in no improvement in oners social status due to parallel action of others. From a policy perspective, my findings therefore suggest that traditional policies targeted to reduce economic inequality may have serious unintended consequences. Rather a more effective approach might be to combine such policies with social policies that represses oners desire to compete in status.