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This paper characterizes status quo rules in the binary social choice environment. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. We show that status quo rules are the only rules that satisfy ontoness, strategy-proofness and a solidarity property. The solidarity property that we consider, positively correlates the welfare of a voter to rest of the voters in case of her improvement. It is independent from the usual solidarity axiom of welfare dominance under preference replacement used in the literature.

Economics

Economics Letters

A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy-proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterize the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of efficiency is not desirable always. Further, we provide a simple description of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. The key feature of our characterization results brings out the role played by indifferent agents.

Fulltext

Social Choice and Welfare

On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives

Conference on Economic Design

<p>Economic Theory Workshop</p>

We consider locally incentive compatible mechanisms with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility. We identify a rich class of type spaces, which includes the single peaked type space, where local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility. Our main result shows that in such type spaces, a mechanism is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible if and only if it is incentive compatible. Payment-only incentive compatibility requires that a mechanism that generates the same allocation at two types must have the same payment at those two types. Our result works on a class of ordinal type spaces, which are generated by considering a set of ordinal preferences over alternatives and then considering all non-negative type vectors representing such preferences.

Games and Economic Behavior

Local incentive compatibility with transfers

In this paper we consider the exogenous indifference classes model of Barber'a and Ehlers (2011) and Sato (2009) and analyze further the relationship between the structure of indifference classes across agents and dictatorship results. The key to our approach is the pairwise partition graph. We provide necessary conditions on these graphs for strategy-proofness and unanimity (or efficiency) to imply dictatorship. These conditions are not sufficient; we also provide separate stronger conditions that are sufficient. A full characterization is obtained in the case of two agents for domains where strategy-proofness and efficiency imply dictatorship.

Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model

This paper generalizes the results in Aswal et al. (Econ Theory 22:45–62, 2003) on dictatorial domains. This is done in two ways. In the first, the notion of connections between pairs of alternatives in Aswal et al. (2003) is weakened to weak connectedness. This notion requires the specification of four preference orderings for every alternative pair. Domains that are linked in the sense of Aswal et al. (2003) with weak connectedness replacing connectedness, are shown to be dictatorial. In the second, the notion of connections for alternative pairs is strengthened relative to its counterpart in Aswal et al. (2003). However, a domain is shown to be dictatorial if the induced graph is merely connected rather than linked. This result generalizes the result in Sato (Rev Econ Design 14:331–342, 2010) on circular domains.